Processing a signal directly in the encrypted domain provides an elegant solution in application scenarios where valuable signals must be protected from a malicious processing device. In a previous paper we considered the implementation of the 1D Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) in the encrypted domain, by using the homomorphic properties of the underlying cryptosystem. In this paper we extend our previous results by considering the application of the 2-dimensional DCT to encrypted images. The effect of the consecutive application of the DCT algorithm first by rows then by columns is considered, as well as the differences between the implementation of the direct DCT algorithm and its fast version. Particular attention is given to block-based DCT, with emphasis on the possibility of lowering the computational burden by parallel application of the encrypted domain DCT algorithm to different image blocks.
INTRODUCTION
The availability of signal processing modules that work directly on encrypted data would be of great help for applications where sensitive signals must be processed. In the image processing field, a recent example regards buyer-seller watermarking protocols [1] which prevent the seller from obtaining a plaintext of the watermarked copy, so that the image containing the buyer's watermark can not be illegally distributed to third parties by the seller. Signal processing in the encrypted domain (s.p.e.d.) is a new field of research aiming at developing a set of specific tools for processing encrypted data to be used as building blocks in a large class of applications. In image processing, one of such tools is the discrete cosine transform (DCT). The availability of an efficient s.p.e.d. DCT would allow a large number of processing tasks to be carried out on encrypted images, like the extraction of encrypted features from an encrypted image.
In [2] , we considered the similar problem of implementing a discrete Fourier transform on encrypted data. Here, we will extend the previous results by considering a s.p.e.d. implementation of the DCT. We will assume that the chosen cryptosystem is homomorphic with respect to the addition, i.e., there exists an operator φ(·, ·) such that
D[φ(E[a], E[b])] = a + b
(1) * The work described in this paper has been supported in part by the European Commission through the IST Programme under Contract no 034238 -SPEED. The information in this document reflects only the author's views, is provided as is and no guarantee or warranty is given that the information is fit for any particular purpose. The user thereof uses the information at its sole risk and liability.
where E[·] and D[·] denote the encryption and decryption operators. With such a cryptosystem it is indeed possible to add two encrypted values without first decrypting them and it is possible to multiply an encrypted value by a public integer value by repeatedly applying the operator φ(·, ·). Moreover, we will assume that the cryptosystem is probabilistic, that is, given two encrypted values it is not possible to decide if they conceal the same value. This is fundamental, since the alphabet to which the input pixels belong is usually limited. A widely known example of a cryptosystem fulfilling both the above requirements is the Paillier cryptosystem [3] , for which the operator φ(·, ·) is a modular multiplication.
The DCT can be computed on the encrypted pixel values by relying on the homomorphic properties and the fact that the DCT coefficients are public. However, this requires several issues to be solved. The first one is that we must represent the pixel values, the DCT coefficients, and the transformed values in the domain of the cryptosystem, i.e., as integers on a finite field/ring. Another problem is that encrypted values can not be scaled or truncated by relying on homomorphic computations only. In general, for scaling the intermediate values of the computation we should allow two or more parties to interact [4] . However, since we would keep the s.p.e.d. DCT as simple as possible, it is preferable to avoid the use of interactive protocols. A final problem is that encrypting each pixel separately increases the size of the encrypted image and affects the complexity.
In this paper, we will provide solutions to the above issues. A convenient s.p.e.d. signal model will be proposed, allowing us to define both a s.p.e.d. DCT and a s.p.e.d. fast DCT and to extend them to the 2D case, by considering the consecutive application of the DCT first by rows then by columns. Moreover, we will propose a block-based s.p.e.d. DCT which permits the parallel application of the s.p.e.d. DCT algorithm to different image blocks, thus lowering both the bandwidth usage and the computational burden.
SIGNAL MODEL
We will describe the method assuming the signals are 1-D sequences. The extension to the 2-D case is straightforward by using separable processing along rows and columns. Let us consider a signal x(n) ∈ R, n = 0, . . . , M − 1. In the following, we will assume |x(n)| ≤ 1. The scaled DCT of type II (DCT-II) of x(n) is defined as
As in [2] , the integer DCT is defined as
where
, · is the rounding function and Q1 and Q2 are suitable scaling factors.
Since all computations are between integers and there is no scaling, the expression above can be evaluated in the encrypted domain by relying on the homomorphic properties. If the inputs are encrypted with the Paillier cryptosystem, the s.p.e.d. DCT is
where all computations are done modulo N 2 [3] .
S.P.E.D. DCT
The computation of the DCT using (3) requires two problems to be tackled with. The first one is that there will be a scaling factor between S(k) and X(k). The second one is that, if the cryptosystem encrypts integers modulo N , one must ensure that there is a oneto-one mapping between S(k) and S(k) mod N . A solution is to find an upper bound on S(k) such that |S(k)| ≤ QS, and verify that N > 2QS. We will show that S(k) can be expressed in general as
where K is a suitable scaling factor and S (k) models the quantization error. Based on the above equation, the desired DCT output can be estimated asX(k) = S(k)/K, and the upper bound is
where S,U is an upper bound on S (k). The value of both K and S,U will depend on the particular implementation of the DCT.
Direct Computation
Let us express s(n) = Q1x(n) + s(n) and CM (n, k) = Q2 cos
If the DCT is directly computed by applying (3), then we have
The scaling factor is KD = Q1Q2. As to the quantization error, we obtain the following upper bound
from which QS,D = MQ1Q2 + S,U,D .
Fast DCT
In order to obtain a s.p.e.d. version of the fast DCT, we will refer to the recursive matrix representation in [5] . Given [TM ] nk = cos
, we have
, . . . , cos
JM is obtained by the M × M identity matrix by reversing the column order and PM is a suitable permutation matrix (see [5] ). Since the only non integer matrix in (9) is D M/2 , the corresponding s.p.e.d. structure can be recursively defined as
(10) where we defineD M/2 = Q2D M/2 .
As to the upper bound analysis, let us consider the mth stage of the recursion and express the quantized matrices asD2m
T . Then, we can rewrite (10) as
From the above equation, we have both a recursive relation on the scaling factor and a recursive relation on the quantization error. Let us consider the vector of quantized inputs
T . With a notation similar to the scalar case, we can express s = Q1x + eS, where x is vector containing the input values and eS is a vector of quantization errors. Hence, the s.p.e.d. fast DCT is given by
T es.
As to the scaling factor, we have KF = K (ν) Q1. Since K (0) = 1, it is easy to derive the final scaling factor as KF = Q ν 2 Q1. As to the quantization error, we have
T ||∞, where || · ||∞ denotes the maximum absolute row sum norm of a matrix. Based on (11), we can give an equivalent recursive relation on ||E (m)
where we used ||A 2 m+1 ||∞ = 2 m+1 − 1, ||B 2 m+1 ||∞ = 2, T ||∞ can be derived as
from which we derive the upper bound on the quantization error as
Finally, the upper bound on S(k) is QS,F = MQ1Q ν 2 + S,U,F .
EXTENSION TO 2D-DCT
In the case of separable processing of the rows and the columns of an image, the expressions derived in the preceding section can be extended to the 2D case in an easy way. Let us assume that the 2D-DCT processes first the rows and then the columns. After the processing of the rows, the input to the next DCT will be expressed as in (5) . Hence, the scaling factor can be obtained by substituting Q1 with K whereas the upper bound on the quantization error can be derived by noting that |S(k)| ≤ MK + S,U and | S (k)| ≤ S,U . In the case of the direct DCT implementation, this leads to
whereas in the case of the fast DCT we obtain
S.P.E.D. BLOCK-BASED DCT
Several image processing algorithms, instead of applying the DCT to the whole image, subdivide it into equal sized (usually square) blocks and compute the DCT of each block. The size of such blocks is usually quite small: typically 8 × 8 blocks or 16 × 16 blocks are used in most of the applications. From the s.p.e.d. perspective, this suggests two things: first, even if rescaling is not applied, in the case of a block based s.p.e.d. DCT the maximum value of the DCT outputs will not be very high. Since the modulus of practical cryptosystems has a size of one thousand bits or more, it is expected that the outputs of the s.p.e.d. blockbased DCT will be far for exploiting the full bandwidth of the modulus. Second, each block undergoes exactly the same processing. Hence, this permits a parallel processing of several blocks by simply packing the pixels having the same position within the blocks in a single word.
In order to exploit the above ideas, we propose a s.p.e.d. block DCT (BDCT) based on a different representation of the input pixels. Let us consider R distinct blocks of an image. For the sake of simplicity, we can assume the blocks as one-dimensional, having size M , since the extension to the 2D case is straightforward using separable processing. Let us define the block bandwidth as B = R √ N . Moreover, let us assume that the input pixel values have been quantized as in Section 2. The pixels having the same position within each block are packed in a single word as
where si(n) denotes the pixel having position n within the ith block. If si(n) + Q1 < B, i = 0, 1, . . . , R − 1 then the packed word can be thought as a base B positive number whose digits are given by si(n) + Q1. Note that the offset Q1 is required in order to have positive digits. The above condition is surely satisfied if B > 2Q1. Moreover, thanks to the definition of B we have |sP (n)| < N. Hence, given the modulo N representation of sP (n) one can always extract the correct values of si(n), i = 0, 1, . . . , R − 1 (That is, it is possible to define a one-to-one mapping between sP (n) and [s0(n), s1(n), . . . , sR−1(n)].).
The s.p.e.d. BDCT is defined as
Theorem 1
The BDCT satisfies
where Si(k) is the s.p.e.d. DCT of si(n). Moreover, if B > 2QS then the BDCT is correctly defined modulo N .
Proof : let us consider the following equalities
Then, by subtracting (24) from the last equality (25) is readily proved. Moreover, if B > 2QS then |SP (k)| < N, so that it is possible to recover Si(k), i = 0, 1, . . . , R − 1 from SP (k). By using the BDCT we are able to process R blocks using a single s.p.e.d. DCT. Therefore, the complexity of the s.p.e.d. BDCT is reduced by a factor R with respect to that of the s.p.e.d. DCT. Moreover, also the bandwidth usage is reduced by the same factor, since we pack R pixels into a single cyphertext. However, note that extracting a single encrypted coefficient from the packed word requires some interactive protocol.
Finally, we would like to point out that the fast DCT algorithm can be used for the BDCT as well. The fast BDCT algorithm can be described by the following steps: 1) compute the fast DCT of the packed signal sP (n); 2) compute the offset Ω(k) by applying the fast DCT to a vector containing all Q1s and by using QS,F in (24); compute the fast BDCT by subtracting Ω(k) found in 2) from the result of 1). In order to verify that the above algorithm is correct, it suffices to substitute C(n, k) in (23)-(24) with the (n, k) element of the matrix CM as defined in (10).
NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We will consider the application of the s.p.e.d. 2D-DCT and 2D-BDCT to square M × M 8-bit greyscale images. The quantization scaling factor can be assumed as Q1 = 128. As to Q2, we will assume that the cosine values are quantized so as not to exceed the quantization error of the corresponding plaintext implementation. Three plaintext implementations are considered: 1) 16-bit fixed point (XP); 2) single precision floating point (FP1); 3) double precision floating point (FP2). In the first case, we can assume Q2 = 2 15 . In the floating point case, since the smallest magnitude of a cosine value is equal to sin(π/2M ), we need Q2 > 2 f / sin(π/2M ), where f is the number of bits of the fractional part of the floating point representation. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume M ≤ 4096, so that we can choose Q2 = 2 36 (FP1) and Q2 = 2 65 (FP2). Since the values of QS in (18)-(21) can be huge, in the case of the full frame DCT we will consider an upper bound on the number of bits required in order to correctly represent the DCT outputs. If we assume Q
Z , this can be expressed as
where ν = log 2 M and Z = {D, F }. Note that if log 2 N > nU,Z, it follows that N > 2QS,Z. In Table 1 , we give some upper bounds considering different values of M and Q2. Highlighted in bold are the cases which can not be implemented relying on a 1024-bit modulus, which is a standard in several cryptographic applications. As can be seen, except for the case of FP2, a full frame s.p.e.d. DCT can be always implemented relying on a standard modulus. As to the s.p.e.d. 2D-BDCT, we consider an estimate of the number of pixels that can be safely packed into a single word. A safe implementation requires B = 2QS,Z . Since we must have B < R √ N , this leads to Rmax = log 2 N log 2 2QS,Z ≈ log 2 N log 2 2QS,Z = RU,Z. (28)
In Table 1 , we give some values of RU,Z considering 8 × 8 and 16 × 16 BDCTs and different precisions. The results demonstrate that the s.p.e.d. BDCT approach can effectively reduce both the bandwidth requirements and the complexity, especially for the fixed point case. It is worth noting that a direct implementation allows us to increase RU,Z up to three times with respect to the fast BDCT.
Since the BDCT usually works with small sized blocks, the complexity of the direct implementation will not be much higher than that of the fast implementation. For instance, an 8 × 8 fast DCT requires 12 multiplications [6] versus the 64 multiplications of a naive direct DCT. Hence, there can be cases in which it is preferable to employ a direct s.p.e.d. BDCT, since this will reduce the bandwidth usage at a small cost in complexity.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have considered the implementation of the DCT on an encrypted image relying on the homomorphic properties of the underlying cryptosystem. It has been shown how the maximum allowable DCT
